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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
In this thesis, visually encrypted images for rights protection and authentication
is studied. Right protection and authentication are discussed in the following sec-
tions.
1.1.1 Right Protection
Human rights include right to life, freedom from torture, freedom from slavery,
freedom of speech, and freedom of thought, etc. In this thesis, right protection
contains two parts, copyright protection and privacy protection. Copyright pro-
tection has a long history. Privacy protection has been paid more attention in
recently years.
The British Statute of Anne 1710, entitled with ”An Act for the Encourage-
ment of Learning, by vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or pur-
chasers of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned”, was the first copy-
right law. Initially copyright law only applied to the copying of books. Because by
that time, digital cameras or computers were not invented. In late 1970s, computer
software was still distributed in audio cassettes, copying was time-consuming and
unreliable, the benefit from making copies were low [1, 2]. Usually, official soft-
ware in audio cassette cost 15 US dollars, audio cassette itself cost 5 US dollars,
8
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Figure 1.1: Microsoft’s report in 2007 [3]. It shows percents of companies who
do online research about candidates and who do not.
moreover, the quality of illegal copy was lower, so copy brought little benifits.
From 1980s to 1990s, floppy disks and CDs were used for media carriers.
These carriers also suffered copyright infringement. For example, copiers could
be reproduced by copying an entire track in floppy disks at a time, ignoring how
the sectors were marked. Recently, it has become very common for software
to requre activation, such as name & serial, a phone activation code, or device
ID(like the IMEI of a smartphone). Technologies for content protection are well
developed and can realize a sufficiently strong protection system, but they are
casuing inconvenience to users.
In the United States, an article with the title ‘The Right To Privacy’, is the
first implicit declaration of a U.S. right to privacy on December 15, 1890. New
technologies are considered to alter the balance between privacy and disclosure.
In earlier ages when digital cameras were not invented, it was hard to imagine ex-
posing one’s image on the Internet. Actually with the development of the Internet,
nearly everything can be saved on the Internet. Fig. 1.1 shows the percentages of
companies who search employee’s information. According to Microsoft’s Report
in 2007, 25% of companies don’t search employees’ information, 75% of compa-
nies search employees’ information before they are hired through web, twitter, etc.
70% of US recruiters report that they rejected candidates because of information
found on the Internet [3].
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Figure 1.2: Log on to a computer.
1.1.2 Authentication
Authentication is the process of identifying an individual, usually based on a user-
name and password. Generally, authentication is used for access control. While
using a computer, a username and a password are required. Fig. 1.2 shows an ex-
ample of logging on to a computer. Fig. 1.3 shows the concept of fingerprint and
iris recognition. A computer system is supported to be used only by authorized
users. The system should detect and exclude the unauthorized users. Common
access control involving authentication include:
• Entering a secure facility by using iris recognition
• Withdrawing money from an ATM
• Opening a door with a key
• Using one time password to log on to a server
• Unlocking an IPHONE 5s by using fingerprint
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Figure 1.3: Concept of using fingerprint and iris recognition.
1.1.3 Problems
With the development of digital communication, it is easy and popular to generate
digital images. It is also convenient for anyone to copy or compile digital images.
This situation makes it difficult to protect the copyright of digital images. More-
over, digital images provide us a lot of information. From the point of individual
privacy protection and secret protection, it is significant to control the accessibility
of changing images content or editing the image freely.
Unauthorized copying and distribution accounted for $2.4 billion in United
States in 1990s [1]. Publishers of music and films in digital form use encryp-
tion to make copying more difficult. Encryption has long been used by militaries
and governments to facilitate secret communication. It is now commonly used in
protecting information within many kinds of civilian systems. For example, the
Computer Security Institute reported that in 2007, 71% of companies surveyed
utilized encryption for some of their data in transit, and 53% utilized encryption
for some of their data in storage [4]. Encryption can be divided into symmetric key
encryption and public key encryption. Symmetric key encryption is also known as
symmetric key algorithm, and is a class of algorithms for cryptography that uses
the same cryptographic key for both encryption of plaintext and decryption of ci-
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Figure 1.4: Figure of symmetric-key algorithm.
phertext. The keys may be identical or there may be a simple transformation to
go between the two keys. The keys, in practice, represent a shared secret between
two or more parties that can be used to maintain a private information link [5–10].
Fig. 1.4 shows the conception of symmetric-key algorithm.
Public-key cryptography, also known as asymmetric cryptography, refers to a
cryptographic algorithm which requires two separate keys one is secret (or pri-
vate) and the other is public. The public key is used to encrypt plaintext; whereas
the private key is used to decrypt ciphertext. It is computationally easy for a user
to generate his or her public and private key-pair and to use them for encryption
and decryption. The strength lies in the fact that it is “impossible” (computa-
tionally infeasible) for a properly generated private key to be determined from its
corresponding public key. Thus the public key may be published without compro-
mising security, whereas the private key should not be known to anyone else. This
relationship ties the keys in the pair exclusively to one another: a public key and
its corresponding private key are paired together and are related to no other keys.
Public key algorithms [11–15], unlike symmetric key algorithms, do not require
a secure initial exchange of secret key between the parties. Fig. 1.5 shows the
conception of asymmetric-key cryptography.
Signal processing techniques in encrypted domain have beenwidely researched
as its application in biometric matching [16–20] and privacy-preserving data min-
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Figure 1.5: Figure of public-key algorithm.
ing [21–26]. Some schemes [27–35] use visual encryption in transmission mul-
timedia data through the Internet while the data need to be encrypted. Some
schemes [36–40] are also used for image matching while protecting the content
of the image. Visual encryption is also used for detection [41–44] of moving ob-
jects of motion JPEG videos. In this thesis, visual encryption is used in the image
trading system and visual cryptography to share secrets.
In traditional ways, digital fingerprinting or transaction tracking [45] which
hides consumers’ information to the content by a data hiding technique is one
of the effective ways to protect the content from illegal copy and distribution in
trading systems [46]. This model is useful only if the content providers (CPs)
are perfectly trustworthy. Practically, CPs are not always trustful, trusted third
parties (TTPs) or arbitrators [47] are introduced to trading systems to enhance the
security. A consumer asks a TTP to send an ID to him/her, and the consumer is
identified by this ID instead of his/her personal information in trading with CPs.
So, CPs are now free from consumers’ privacy. A CP sends the content which the
consumer purchases to the TTP, and the TTP embeds consumer ID to the content
before transmitting the content to the consumer. Now, the TTP plays the most
important role in the trading system and has potential risk of accidental leakage of
consumers’ privacy, because the TTP knows and stores all the transactions among
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consumers and CP and consumer information themselves. To reduce the above
potential leaking risk at TTPs, a new framework has been proposed for TTP-
based content trading systems [48–52]; a content is divided into two pieces by a
CP. One piece is sent to a consumer, and the other is fingerprinted by the TTP
before the consumer receives it. This time TTP knows only a part of the content.
In the literature [48–52], an image is equally divided into two pieces in the spatial
domain, and another literature [53] uses saliency map [54] to effectively divide
images in the spatial domain.
These conventional schemes [48–53] still face unsolvable problems: while
dividing images into two pieces in the spatial domain, 1) the piece to be water-
marked is smaller than the original image, this leads to relative weakness of digital
fingerprinting or distortion of watermarked images, and 2) an adversary has a pos-
sibility to estimate the original image from the piece which is leaked from a TTP.
So, in order to protect consumer’s privacy, it is quite necessary to keep the piece
sent to TTP unrecognizable.
This theis proposes a use of amplitude-only images for the trading systems
with TTPs [55]. It is well known that amplitude-only images are unrecognizable
in comparisons with phase-only images which are inversely transformed phase
spectra of original images [56, 57]. Any arbitrary fingerprinting mechanism such
as spread spectrum watermarking [58]-based implementation [59] can be used
in this conventional scheme. An image quality guaranteeing block discrete co-
sine transformation (DCT)-based data hiding technique [60] is used as an ex-
ample of the digital fingerprinting technique here. Several attacks provided by
StirMark [62, 63] and compression by JPEG 2000 [64] are used to evaluate the
proposed scheme.
A secret sharing (SS) scheme [65] divides a secret into n pieces referred to as
shares. n shares are held by n different parties and the secret is recovered if and
only if k or more shares are gathered. This scheme is called as a (k, n)-threshold
SS scheme. Visual SS (VSS) in which decryption can be done by human eyes
has been proposed for binary images [66]. Later, VSS has been extended to non-
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Figure 1.6: Different kinds of encryptions.
binary images [67, 68]. Color VSS have also been proposed [69–71]. Instead
of random share images [66], meaningful shares are employed in a scheme [72].
Some schemes [73, 74] allow to embed multi-secret within one image. A weaken
security scheme [75, 76] is also proposed to improve the visuality of recovered
image. Other direction reduces the pixel expansion size and improves the contrast
of the recovered image [77, 78].
On the other hand, it is assumed in a scenario that malicious parties deceive
an honest party, and cheat-prevention VSS schemes have been proposed to fight
it [53, 79, 80, 82]. A literature [81] found that the original cheat-prevention VSS
scheme [80] is not well function in some circumstances. The literature [81] also
proposes a new scheme, but pixel expansion is sacrificed significantly. Later,
the same authors proposed another scheme [82] with less pixel expansion, but its
application is limited to (2, n)-threshold VSS and it introduces a further restriction.
These conventional schemes [48–53] of image trading system and conven-
tional schemes [79–82] of visual cryptography still face unsolvable problems:
1. The piece to be watermarked is smaller than the original image, this leads
to relatively weakness of digital fingerprinting or distorted of watermarked
images
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2. An adversary has a possibility to estimate the original image from the piece
which is leaked from a TTP
3. Although compression is requested in reality, non of these conventional
schemes take compression into consideration.
4. Cheating Prevention is not well functional or limitation is too much.
5. The contrast of revealed secret image is low, it is hard to recognize by hu-
man eyes.
Fig. 1.6 shows differents kinds of encryption. It is proved that encryption is
good way for rights protection and anthentication. From the aspects of security,
encryption can be divided into information theoretic encryption and computationl
security encryption. In information theoretic encryption, the encrypted files are
theoretically secure. In computational security encryption, the encrypted files are
secure because of limited computational power. Visually encrypted images belong
to both. This property makes visually encrypted images applicable in different
areas. For visually encrypted images, the plaintext is an image and the encrypted
file is an image, that is to say, the format is preversed.
1.2 Aim of this thesis
Through consideration of new expression and perspective of visually encryption
image, this thesis is aimed at development of new theoretical visually encryption
method. The main aims are as follows:
1. Copyright protection in the image trading system and authentication of im-
ages’ accessibility in visual cryptography
2. Reduction of the affection caused by lossy compression of visual encryption
in the image trading system
3. Improvement the contrast of revealed secret image and the robustness against
malicious attack
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1.3 Organization
This thesis is organized around the three purposes. The reminder of this thesis is
organized as follows.
Chapter 2: Visually Encrypted Images
Visually encrypted images are described in this chapter. The definition of visu-
ally encrypted images is given. There are different techniques to produce visually
encrypted images, two of which are discussed in details. In the image trading sys-
tem, amplitude-only image is used for visually encryption. In visual cryptography,
random pixel expansion is used for visually encryption.
Chapter 3: Image Trading System for Copyright- and Privacy-
Protection
An image trading system should protect the images’ copyright and consumers’
privacy as well. However, in conventional schemes, consumers’ privacy is not
well protected, that is, potential information leakage will reflect consumers’ pri-
vacy. This chapter proposes a novel image trading system in which images’ copy-
right and consumers’ privacy are both protected.
Chapter 4: Compression-Friendly Image Trading System for
Copyright- and Privacy-Protection
In the previous chapter, compression is not considered. Actually, compression
is always requested when images are either transmitted on the Internet or being
stored in servers. In this chapter, an image trading system with efficient com-
pression is proposed. JPEG 2000 lossy compression is applied in this chapter.
Its affection between conventional image systems and the proposed system are
evaluated.
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Chapter 5: Cheating Prevention Visual Cryptography
Visual cryptography is also called visual secret sharing. Contrast of revealed se-
cret image is very important. Usually, in order to gain the highest contrast, pixel
expansion is minimized. As the pixel expansion is minimized, cheating between
share holders may happen. Conventional schemes have been proposed to prevent
cheating. However, either larger pixel expansion is used or cheating prevention
is not well functional. In this chapter, a new cheating prevention visual cryptog-
raphy is proposed. The proposed scheme gain larger contrast of revealed secret
image with relatively less pixel expansion. At the same time, cheating prevention
is functional.
Chapter 6: Conclusion
Chapter 6 concludes this thesis and mention several possible extensions that may
be of interest for application and future research.
Chapter 2
Visually Encrypted Images
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, Visually encrypted images are introduced. For visually encrypted
images, the format of input files is image and the format of output files is also
image. It is difficult to estimate visual information of original image from the
visually encrypted image. Fig. 2.1 shows different applications of visually en-
crypted images. This chapter introduces visually encrypted images in image trad-
ing system and access control in details. The rest of the applications are roughly
reviewed.
Visual encryption is one kind of signal processing techniques in encrypted
domain. Visual encryption techniques have drawn much attention in recent years
due to its application in biometric matching [16–20] and privacy-preserving data
mining [21–26]. Usually, visual encryption is used to protect the content of images
and videos in different applications. Visual encryption can be widely used in
transmission of multimedia data through the Internet while the data need to be
encrypted [27–35]. Fig. 2.2 shows an example of a scheme [30] for a commutative
perceptual encryption and image compression for JPEG 2000.
Visual encryption is also used for image matching while protecting the content
of the image [36–40]. In these schemes, scrambling methods for image matching
using phase-only correlation (POC) or discrete cosine transform sign phase corre-
19
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Figure 2.1: Different applications of visually encrypted images.
lation (DCT-SPC) are proposed. These methods distort only the phase, which has
significant information of images. The information in each image is protected by
the distorted phase information. Fig. 2.3 shows the original and phase scrambled
images. Visual encryption is also used for detection [41–44] of moving objects
of motion JPEG videos. In this scheme, a scrambling method for motion JPEG
(MJ) videos and moving objects (MOs) detection from scrambled videos is pro-
posed. Both scrambling and MOs detection utilize the property of the positive and
negative sign of discrete cosine transform (DCT) coefficients. Fig. 2.4 shows the
original and visually encrypted frames.
Many kinds of techniques can be used for generation of visually encrypted
images, such as amplitude-only image, block scrambling in spatial domain, ran-
dom pixel expansion, etc. This thesis uses amplitude-only image and random
pixel expansion for image trading system and access control, respectively. Visu-
ally encrypted images are used in the image trading system for the protection of
consumer privacy and image copyright and they are also used in visual cryptogra-
phy to share secrets. In the following sections, amplitude-only image and visual
cryptography are discussed in details.
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(a) Encryption and compression.
(b) Decryption and decompression.
Figure 2.2: This scheme [30] is a commutative perceptual encryption and image
compression for JPEG 2000.
2.2 Amplitude-Only Image
According to the domain where an amplitude-only image is generated, amplitude-
only image can be divided into two types, namely, discrete Fourier transformation
based amplitude-only image (DFT-based amplitude-only image) and discrete co-
sine transformation based amplitude-only image (DCT-based amplitude-only im-
age).
2.2.1 DFT-based Amplitude-Only Image
N1 × N2-sized original image f = { f (n1, n2)} where n1 = 0, 1, . . . ,N1 − 1 and n2 =
0, 1, . . . ,N2 − 1 is firstly transformed to two-dimensional (2D) discrete Fourier
spectra F = {F (k1, k2)} where k1 = 0, 1, . . . ,N1 − 1 and k2 = 0, 1, . . . ,N2 − 1 by
applying the 2D discrete Fourier transformation (DFT) to f. That is, image signal
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(a) Original image ‘Lena’. (b) Phase scrambled image.
Figure 2.3: Original and phase scrambled images of schemes [36, 37].
f and spectra F are given as,
f (n1, n2) =
1
N1N2
N1−1∑
k1=0
N2−1∑
k2=0
F (k1, k2)W
−k1n1
N1
W−k2n2N2 , (2.1)
F (k1, k2) =
N1−1∑
n1=0
N2−1∑
n2=0
f (n1, n2)W
k1n1
N1
Wk2n2N2 , (2.2)
where, WN1 = exp
(
− j2pi
N1
)
, WN2 = exp
(
− j2pi
N2
)
, and j =
√−1.
Spectra F can be divided to amplitude and phase spectra as
Fa = {Fa (k1, k2)} = {|F (k1, k2)|} , (2.3)
Fp =
{
Fp (k1, k2)
}
=
{
F (k1, k2)
|F (k1, k2)|
}
, (2.4)
where Fa and Fp are amplitude and phase spectra, respectively. Applying the
inverse 2D DFT to Fa and Fp, N1×N2-sized amplitude-only image fa and N1×N2-
sized phase-only image fp are generated, respectively.
2.2.2 DCT-based Amplitude-Only Image
N1 × N2-sized original image f = { f (n1, n2)} where n1 = 0, 1, . . . ,N1 − 1 and n2 =
0, 1, . . . ,N2 − 1 is firstly transformed to 2D discrete cosine spectra F = {F (k1, k2)}
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(a) Original frames.
(b) Visually encrypted frames.
Figure 2.4: Original and visually scrambled frames of scheme [44].
where k1 = 0, 1, . . . ,N1 − 1 and k2 = 0, 1, . . . ,N2 − 1 by applying the 2D discrete
cosine transformation (DCT) to f. That is, image signal f and spectra F are given
as,
f (n1, n2) =
N1−1∑
k1=0
N2−1∑
k2=0
α(k1)α(k2)F(k1, k2)C(n1, k1,N1)C(n2, k2,N2), (2.5)
F(k1, k2) = α(k1)α(k2)
N1−1∑
n1=0
N2−1∑
n2=0
f (n1, n2)C(n1, k1,N1)C(n2, k2,N2), (2.6)
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where,
α(k1) =

√
1/N1, k1 = 0
√
2/N1, otherwise
, (2.7)
α(k2) =

√
1/N2, k2 = 0
√
2/N2, otherwise
, (2.8)
C(n1, k1,N1) = cos
(2n1 + 1)k1pi
2N1
, (2.9)
C(n2, k2,N2) = cos
(2n2 + 1)k2pi
2N2
. (2.10)
Spectra F can be divided to amplitude and phase spectra as
Fa(k1, k2) = |F(k1, k2)| , (2.11)
Fp(k1, k2) = sgn (F(k1, k2)) , (2.12)
where Fa and Fp are amplitude and sign spectra, respectively. Applying the in-
verse 2D DCT to Fa and Fp, N1 × N2-sized amplitude-only image fa and N1 × N2-
sized phase-only image fp are generated, respectively.
2.2.3 Amplitude-Only Image with Random sign
Firstly, a CP divides N1 × N2-sized original image f = { f (n1, n2)} to N1 × N2-
sized Amplitude-Only Image (AOI) f′a =
{
f ′a(n1, n2)
}
and N1 × N2-sized phase
components Fp =
{
Fp(k1, k2)
}
where n1 = 0, 1, . . . ,N1 − 1, n2 = 0, 1, . . . ,N2 − 1,
k1 = 0, 1, . . . ,N1 − 1, and k2 = 0, 1, . . . ,N2 − 1.
1. The CP applies 2D DCT to f to get N1 × N2-sized 2D-DCT coefficients
F = {F(k1, k2)};
2. Separate real numbered DCT coefficients F into amplitude componentsFa =
{Fa(k1, k2)} and phase components Fp.
where Fa(k1, k2) and Fp(k1, k2) are amplitude and phase component of F(k1, k2),
respectively, and sgn(·) returns the positive and negative sign of the input.
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It is noted that
F(k1, k2) = Fa(k1, k2)Fp(k1, k2). (2.13)
3. N1 × N2-sized random matrix R = {R(k1, k2)} which consists of ±1 is multi-
plied to Fa as
F′a = Fa ◦ R, (2.14)
where ◦ represents Hadamard product.
4. Applying the inverse 2D DCT (2D-IDCT) to F′a generates AOI f
′
a.
2.3 Visual Cryptography
Secret sharing (also called secret splitting) is referred as distributing a secret
among a group of parties, each of whom holds a share (or shares) of the secret.
The secret can be recovered only when enough share holders combine their shares
together. Individual shares are completely of no use on their own. Generally, there
is one dealer and n parties. The dealer distributes a secret into n shares and gives
these shares to the parties, but only when specific conditions are fulfilled will the
parties be able to recover the secret from their shares. The dealer accomplishes
this by giving each player a share in such a way that any group of k (for thresh-
old) or more players can together recover the secret but no group of less than k
parties can. Such a scheme is called a (k, n)-threshold scheme. Secret sharing was
invented independently by Adi Shamir and George Blakley in 1979 [65].
Secret sharing is an ideal scheme to store sensitive and important information.
Examples include: encryption keys, missile launch codes, and numbered bank ac-
counts. Each of these pieces of information must be kept confidential, as their ex-
posure could be disastrous, however, it is also critical that they should not be lost.
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Figure 2.5: An example of the first and fundamental visual secret sharing
scheme [66]. All two shares are required to recover the secret image in this exam-
ple; (2, 2)-threshold implementation.
Traditional methods for encryption are not suitable for simultaneously achieving
high levels of confidentiality and reliability. Because while storing the encryption
key, one must choose between keeping a single copy of the key in one location
for maximum secrecy, or keeping multiple copies of the key in different locations
for greater reliability. Increasing reliability of the key by storing multiple copies
lowers confidentiality by creating additional attack vectors; there are more oppor-
tunities for a copy to fall into the wrong hands. Secret sharing schemes address
this problem, and allow arbitrarily high levels of confidentiality and reliability to
be achieved.
When a dealer distributes a secret into many images (share images), a secret
sharing scheme becomes a visual cryptography. Visual cryptography is a cryp-
tographic technique which allows visual information (pictures, text, etc.) to be
encrypted in such a way that decryption becomes a mechanical operation that
does not require a computer. Fig. 2.5 shows the simplest example of the VSS
scheme [66]. In the VSS scheme [66], a secret binary image consisting of black
and white pixels is split up to n shares in which all shares are random binary
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(a) Horizontal 1. (b) Horizontal 2. (c) Vertical 1.
(d) Vertical 2. (e) Diagonal 1. (f) Diagonal 2.
(g) Four black pixels.
Figure 2.6: Random pads for (2, 2)-threshold visual secret sharing scheme [66].
(a)-(f) six pads for expanding a pixel in a secret image to a 2× 2-sized pixel block
in a share. (g) a black pixel in the secret image is represented by a black pixel
block in stacked shares, i.e., in the decrypted image.
images. When k or more shares printed on transparencies are stacked together,
the human eyes can do the decryption for recovering the secret image, whereas
the decryption is totally unsuccessful except the size of the secret image if less
than k shares are collected and superimposed. This condition is referred to as
(k, n)-threshold VSS as well as the ordinary SS [65]. In this scheme, each pixel
is handled individually and it should be noted that the white pixel represents the
transparent color.
In the (2, 2)-threshold implementation, i.e., k = 2 and n = 2, of the conven-
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tional VSS scheme [66], each pixel of a secret binary image is expanded to a
2 × 2-sized pixel block in share images. To expand a pixel of the secret image,
this implementation uses six of 2×2-sized matrices referred to as random pads as
shown in Figs. 2.6; they are horizontal pads (Figs. 2.6 (a) and (b)), vertical pads
(Figs. 2.6 (c) and (d)), and diagonal pads (Figs. 2.6 (e) and (f)), i.e., three pad
pairs exist.
Two pads are used to generate two shares. When a pixel in the secret binary
image is black, one pad pair among three pairs is chosen and a pad and the other
are assigned to one share and the other, respectively. On the other hand, if the pixel
is white, one pad among six pads is used twice to generate two shares. When the
shares are superimposed, the black pixel in the secret image will be represented
of a black pixel block as shown in Fig. 2.6 (g), and the white pixel in the original
binary image will be represented of two white and two black pixels as shown in
Fig. 2.6 (a)-(f).
Recall Fig. 2.5 here. Figure 2.5 is an example of (2, 2)-threshold implemen-
tation of the conventional VSS scheme [66]. In this example, a 64 × 64-sized
original binary image is expanded to 128 × 128-sized shares by using six pads
shown in Fig. 2.6, and thus, the recovered image becomes 128× 128-sized.
2.4 Advantages of Visually Encrypted Images
In image trading system, amplitude-only images can be used to prevent estimate
the original image. So, even if the images sent to TTP are released accidently,
there is no clue what kind of images the users are buying.
In visual cryptography, random pixel expansion can be used to produce se-
cret shares. Visual cryptography belongs to information theoretic encryption, so
the secret information cannot be recovered if not enough shares are stacked or
analyzed.
Chapter 3
Image Trading System for
Copyright- and Privacy-Protection
3.1 Introduction
With the development of digital equipment, billions of multimedia can be found
in the Internet with copyright or without copyright, and more and more multi-
media contents will be put on the Internet for sale. With popularity of personal
computers, the existing adversary will be more powerful and this also brings any
individual convenience to be an adversary. In addition, any transactions between
providers and consumers are stored in the Internet, the information leakage be-
comes more serious. So, the simultaneous protection of the copyright of multime-
dia and the privacy of consumers becomes a critical problem.
In traditional ways, digital fingerprinting or transaction tracking [45] which
hides consumers’ information to the content by a data hiding technique is one
of the effective way to protect the content from illegal copy and distribution in
trading systems [46]. This model is useful only if the content providers (CPs) are
perfectly trustworthy. From a practical viewpoint, since any individual can be a
CP to distribute multimedia over the Internet, CPs are not always trustful; it has
the potential to be cracked. So, the conventional fingerprinting is not well enough
to protect the privacy of consumer.
29
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In order to overcome this situation, trusted third parties (TTPs) or arbitra-
tors [47] are introduced to trading systems. A consumer asks a TTP to send an
ID to him/her, and the consumer is identified by this ID instead of his/her per-
sonal information in trading with CPs. So, CPs are now free from consumers’
privacy. A CP sends the content which the consumer purchases to the TTP, and
the TTP embeds consumer ID to the content before transmitting the content to
the consumer. Now, the TTP plays the most important role in the trading system
and cannot afford to accidental leakage of consumers’ privacy, because the TTP
knows and stores all the transactions among consumers and CPs and consumer
information themselves.
To reduce the above potential leaking risk at TTPs, a new framework has been
proposed for TTP-based content trading systems [48–52]; a content is divided into
two pieces by a CP. One piece is directly sent to a consumer by the CP, and the
other is watermarked by the TTP before the consumer receives it. The consumer
obtains the watermarked content by combining two received pieces. By doing so,
the TTP knows only a part of the content. In the literature [48–52], an image is
equally divided into two pieces in the spatial domain, and another literature [53]
uses saliency map [54] to effectively divide images in the spatial domain.
These conventional schemes [48–53] still face unsolvable problems: while
dividing images into two pieces in the spatial domain, 1) the piece to be water-
marked is smaller than the original image, this leads to relatively weakness of
digital fingerprinting or distorted of watermarked images, and 2) an adversary has
a possibility to estimate the original image from the piece which is leaked from a
TTP. So, in order to protect consumer’s privacy, it is quite necessary to keep the
piece sent to TTP unrecognizable.
This chapter proposes a use of amplitude-only images for the trading systems
with TTPs [55]. An amplitude-only image is inversely transformed amplitude
spectra of an image. It is well known that amplitude-only images are unrecog-
nizable in comparisons with phase-only images which are inversely transformed
phase spectra of original images [56,57]. In the proposed system, the image to be
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transmitted to a consumer is divided into the amplitude- and phase-only images.
The former will be watermarked by a TTP and the latter is directly sent to the con-
sumer. Since the most of digital fingerprinting techniques modify the amplitude
components of images, almost any arbitrary technique can be used in the proposed
system and the robustness of watermarks only depends on the used fingerprinting
technique. Since the proposed system uses amplitude-only images whose size is
the same as the original image instead of spatially divided images, it is found that
the proposed scheme is more robust than the conventional schemes.
The rest of the chapter is arranged as follows. In Section 3.2, the frame-
work of image trading systems and the conventional schemes for the system with
TTPs in which an image is divided into two pieces [48–53] will be reviewed.
The new scheme is proposed in Section 4.3. Experimental results are showed in
Section 4.4, and conclusions and future work are given in Section 4.5.
3.2 Preliminaries
This section reviews the framework for image trading systems and the conven-
tional schemes based on the framework with TTPs in which images are divided
into two pieces [48–53].
3.2.1 Frameworks
Figure 3.1 shows the framework for image trading systems; (a) the classical dig-
ital fingerprinting-based system [46], (b) the system with TTPs [47], and (c) the
system with TTPs in which an image is divided into two pieces [48–53]. In the
classical system [46], the image sold from a CP to a consumer conveys the con-
sumer’s digital fingerprinting, so the copyright of the image is protected. The
consumer’s privacy, however, is not guaranteed to be protected from malicious or
vulnerable CPs.
The second framework introduces TTPs to the framework itself in which a
TTP stands between a CP and a consumer [47]. The TTP issues a consumer ID
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(a) Classical digital fingerprinting-based [46].
(b) With trusted third parties [47].
(c) With trusted third parties and images are divided into two pieces [48–52].
Figure 3.1: Image trading systems.
to the consumer and all transactions between the CP and the TTP are based on
the ID instead of the consumer’s information themselves. That is, the consumer’s
private information is protected from CPs. The TTP also embeds the consumer ID
to the image which is from the CP to the consumer to protect the copyright of the
image. This framework protects consumer’s privacy from malicious or vulnerable
CPs but not from accidental leakage of consumer information at TTPs.
To overcome this situation, a CP divides an image into two pieces in the latest
framework [48–52]. One piece which is relatively less important part is directly
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Figure 3.2: Conventional scheme 1 [48–52]. Original image ‘I’ is divided into
two pieces ‘I1’ and ‘I2’ through frequency decomposition (FQ), block-based
checker board pattern decomposition (BC), block-based noise-like bitplane de-
composition (ND), and block shuﬄing (RS).
sent to a consumer, whereas the other important piece is sent to a TTP. The TTP
hides the consumer ID to the received piece, and it sends the watermarked piece
to the consumer. The consumer composes the watermarked image from two re-
ceived pieces. The TTP now knows a part of the image from which the whole
image cannot be estimated, so the privacy of the consumer is now expected to be
protected.
3.2.2 Conventional Schemes
This section reviews the two conventional schemes [48–53] for the last framework
mentioned above, from the viewpoint of image decomposition.
Conventional Scheme 1
Figure 3.2 is the block diagram of the conventional scheme 1 [50], where an image
is divided into two pieces by a combination of frequency decomposition (‘FQ’ in
Fig. 3.2), block-based checker board pattern decomposition (BC), block-based
noise-like bitplane decomposition (ND), and block shuﬄing (RS). Figure 3.3
shows (a) original image ‘I,’ (b) piece ‘I1,’ and (c) piece ‘I2’ in this conventional
scheme. Piece ‘I2’ in which blocks are shuﬄed to be invisible is watermarked by
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(a) Original image ‘I.’
(b) Piece ‘I1.’ (c) Piece ‘I2.’
Figure 3.3: Images in the conventional scheme 1 [48–52]. Piece ‘I1’ is directly
sent to a consumer, whereas ‘I2’ is watermarked by a trusted third party.
a TTP. Here, it is found that important information of original image ‘I’ are left in
piece ‘I2’ and ‘I’ can be estimated from ‘I2.’
In addition, the TTP in this conventional scheme [50] uses two proprietary wa-
termarking mechanisms, namely, coefficients comparison embedding and patch-
work watermarking, because ‘I2’ contains two different characteristic blocks; high
frequency component blocks and noise-like blocks, and two watermarking mech-
anisms are suitable to each of them.
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Figure 3.4: Conventional scheme 2 [53]. An original image is divided into two
pieces based on the saliency map of the image.
Conventional Scheme 2
Figure 5.5 shows the block diagram of conventional scheme 2 [53]. First, the
saliency [54] of original image ‘I’ is calculated to extract the important content
of ‘I.’ Image ‘I’ is, then, decomposed into two pieces based on the saliency map.
Figure 3.5 (a) is original image ‘I,’ and Fig. 3.5 (b) shows the saliency map of
‘I’ obtained by a saliency detection technique [54]. The map is then binarized
(Fig. 3.5 (c)) and divided into blocks (Fig. 3.5 (d)), and two pieces shown in
Figs. 3.5 (f) and (e) are generated from the original image based on this block
divided map. It is found that from the image shown in Fig. 3.5 (g) which the TTP
receives, the original image can be estimated.
Even the reshaped ‘I2’ is a small and long image, it is a normal image. So, any
arbitrary fingerprinting mechanism such as spread spectrum watermarking [58]-
based implementation [59] can be used in this conventional scheme.
The above mentioned two conventional schemes [48–53] do divide original
image ‘I’ into two pieces ‘I1’ and ‘I2,’ but ‘I2’ which is watermarked by a TTP
can be still visible in both schemes as shown as Figs. 3.3 (c) and 3.5 (f). That is,
the privacy information of consumers are not perfectly protected.
The next section proposes a completely new image decomposition scheme for
image trading systems. Images passed to TTPs are completely invisible, whereas
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images sent to consumers are visible but drastically degraded.
3.3 Proposed Scheme
This section proposes a new trading system by using amplitude-only images. Fig-
ure 4.1 shows the block diagram of the proposed scheme. In the proposed scheme,
an original image is divided into an amplitude-only image which is watermarked
by a TTP and a phase-only image which is directly sent to a consumer. The image
decomposition and digital fingerprinting in the proposed scheme are described in
the subsequent sections and the feature of the proposed scheme is then summa-
rized.
3.3.1 Image Decomposition
In the proposed scheme, N1 × N2-sized original image f = { f (n1, n2)} where n1 =
0, 1, . . . ,N1 − 1 and n2 = 0, 1, . . . ,N2 − 1 is firstly transformed to two-dimensional
(2D) discrete Fourier spectra F = {F (k1, k2)} where k1 = 0, 1, . . . ,N1 − 1 and
k2 = 0, 1, . . . ,N2 − 1 by applying 2D discrete Fourier transformation (DFT) to f.
That is, image signal f and spectra F are given as,
f (n1, n2) =
1
N1N2
N1−1∑
k1=0
N2−1∑
k2=0
F (k1, k2)W
−k1n1
N1
W−k2n2N2 , (3.1)
F (k1, k2) =
N1−1∑
n1=0
N2−1∑
n2=0
f (n1, n2)W
k1n1
N1
Wk2n2N2 , (3.2)
where, WN1 = exp
(
− j2pi
N1
)
, WN2 = exp
(
− j2pi
N2
)
, and j =
√−1.
Spectra F can be divided to amplitude and phase spectra as
Fa = {Fa (k1, k2)} = {|F (k1, k2)|} , (3.3)
Fp =
{
Fp (k1, k2)
}
=
{
F (k1, k2)
|F (k1, k2)|
}
, (3.4)
where Fa and Fp are amplitude and phase spectra, respectively. Applying the
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inverse DFT to Fa and Fp, N1 × N2-sized amplitude-only image fa and N1 × N2-
sized phase-only image fp are generated, respectively.
A TPP receives fa and it generates watermarked amplitude-only image fˆa. A
consumer receives watermarked amplitude-only image fˆa from the TPP and phase-
only image fp from a CP. By applying 2D-DFT to fˆa and fp, watermarked ampli-
tude spectra Fˆa and phase spectra Fp are obtained, respectively. Watermarked
spectra Fˆ is obtained by composite Fˆa and Fp, and watermarked image fˆ is finally
obtained by applying the inverse DFT to Fˆ.
3.3.2 Digital Fingerprinting
In the proposed scheme, amplitude-only image fa is used for digital fingerprint-
ing. As most fingerprinting techniques modify the amplitude components of im-
ages, almost any arbitrary fingerprinting techniques are applicable to the proposed
scheme.
It is noted that the size of amplitude-only image fa is the same as original
image f as mentioned in the previous section whereas the size of the image sent
to TTP to be watermarked is smaller than the original image in the conventional
schemes [48–53]. This brings more payload capacity, more robustness, or better
image quality in the proposed scheme while using most fingerprinting techniques.
3.3.3 Features
This section summarizes the features of the proposed scheme, namely, an amplitude-
only image is unrecognizable and it has the same image size as the original image.
The proposed scheme divides an original image in the frequency domain,
whereas the conventional schemes [48–53] do in the spatial domain. It has two ad-
vantages. The first one is that the amplitude-only image is unrecognizable [56,57]
and it gives no valuable information about the original image to a TTP, i.e., the
TTP will has no knowledge about what kind of image the consumer is purchas-
ing. The second advantage is that phase-only image is recognizable [56, 57] and
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the consumer can confirm whether the piece is for the image which he/she pur-
chased. The phase-only image is degraded and has no commercial value by it-
self, so the copyright of the image is protected. It is concluded that the usage of
amplitude- and phase-only images makes copyright- and privacy-protected image
trading systems practical.
The proposed scheme embeds fingerprints to amplitude-only images. Most
digital fingerprinting techniques modify the amplitude of images, so almost any
arbitrary fingerprinting techniques can be used in the proposed image trading sys-
tem. In addition, an amplitude-only image has the same size as the original image,
whereas the image to be passed to a TTP is smaller than the original image in the
conventional schemes [48–53]. The proposed scheme, thus, has an advantage that
watermarked images are less degraded, more robust, or have larger capacity in
comparison with the conventional schemes [48–53].
3.4 Experimental Results
This section confirms that piece ‘I1’ which is directly sent to a consumer and piece
‘I2’ which is sent to a TTP to be watermarked have the following properties in the
proposed scheme:
1. Image ‘I’ can be recognized from ‘I1.’
2. Piece ‘I1’ has no commercial value.
3. No one can estimate the original image ‘I’ from ‘I2.’
4. TTP can robustly embed a watermark into piece ‘I2.’
1), 2), and 3) are discussed in Section 4.4.1, and 5) is discussed in Section 4.4.3.
3.4.1 Unrecognizability and Recognizability of Pieces
Figures 4.3 (a) and (b) show amplitude-only image fa (piece ‘I2’) and phase-only
image fp (piece ‘I1’) of original image f (image ‘I’) shown in Fig. 4.3 (a), respec-
CHAPTER 3: Image Trading System for Copyright- and Privacy-Protection 39
tively.
1) As shown in Fig. 4.3 (b), the edge of the original image is left, so original
image ‘I’ can be recognized. In this way, the consumer can confirm the image he/
she bought.
2) Piece ‘I1’ only reveals the edges of the original image as shown in Fig. 4.3 (b),
it obviously has no commercial value.
3) Since piece ‘I2’ shown in Fig. 3.3 (c) is obtained by interleaving blocks,
there is a chance that piece ‘I2’ can be reconstructed similar to ‘I1’ which is
shown in Fig. 3.3 (b). As image ‘I’ can be estimated from ‘I1,’ it is quite possible
to estimate ‘I’ from deinterleaved ‘I2.’ Even the whole original image can’t be
estimated, several blocks may leak sensitive information about ‘I.’ For example,
conventional schemes [48–53] are applied to the image shown as Fig. 3.5 (a), the
flight number on the tail of the airplane might be left. In contrast, piece ‘I2’ shown
in Fig. 4.3 (a) is completely unrecognizable [56, 57] in the proposed scheme, i.e.,
no valuable information can be obtained.
It is, thus, concluded that the proposed scheme protects consumer’s privacy
against accidental information leakage from the TTP, whereas the conventional
schemes [48–53] cannot completely protect the privacy as shown as Figs. 3.3 (c)
and 3.5 (f).
3.4.2 Fingerprinting Performance
The robustness of the digital fingerprinting in the proposed scheme is compared
with the conventional scheme 2 [53] by using the data hiding technique described
in the next section.
Fingerprinting Technique
Almost any arbitrary data hiding technique can be used in the proposed and con-
ventional schemes [53], an image quality guaranteeing block discrete cosine trans-
formation (DCT)-based data hiding technique [60] is used as an example of the
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digital fingerprinting technique here.
Figure 3.8 shows the block diagram of the embedding technique. N1 × N2-
sized amplitude-only image fa is divided into Bx×By-sized blocks, and 2D DCT is
applied in each block. The embedding technique modifies T of DCT coefficients
in each Bx × By-sized block to embed watermark to fa, where 0 < T ≤ BxBy and
T coefficients are selected from low frequency coefficients. After modification
of T DCT coefficients, applying inverse 2D DCT and block composition give
watermarked amplitude-only image fˆa.
It is assumed that the digital fingerprint for consumer i is wi with length L;
wi =
{
wi,l
}
, (3.5)
where l = 0, 1, . . . , L − 1. It is also assumed that
∣∣∣wi,l − w¯i∣∣∣ is finite, where w¯i
is the average of wi and σw is the standard deviation of wi. For binary sequence
wi = {wi,l ∈ {0, 1}}, w¯i = 0.5 and σw = 0.5. Fingerprintwi is adjusted to w′i =
{
w′i,l
}
as
w′i,l = a
(
wi,l − w¯i) (3.6)
before data hiding, where a is the scaling constant given by
a =
MσQ
2Nσσw
. (3.7)
Finally, T of DCT coefficients in each Bx × By-sized block are modified to water-
mark as
cˆt = Q round
(
ct
Q
)
+ w′i,l, (3.8)
where ct is the t-th chosen coefficient and t = 0, 1, ..., T − 1. Function round(·)
returns the nearest integer of the input. Hidden fingerprint wˆi,l is easily extracted
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by
wˆ′i,l = cˆt − Q round
(
cˆt
Q
)
, (3.9)
wˆi,l =
(
wˆ′i,l
a
+ w¯i
)
. (3.10)
Mσ is used for energy adjustment and 0 < Mσ < 1. Q is the quantization step
for data hiding and it is given by
Q = 10−0.05R
√√√√√√√√
N1−1∑
n1=0
N2−1∑
n2=0
f 2a (n1, n2)
N1N2
BxBy
T
D
, (3.11)
where fa(x, y) is the pixel value at position (x, y) of image fa. R is the desired
signal-to-watermark ratio (SWR) which this fingerprinting technique guarantees
the SWR of a watermarked image becomes R [dB]. The SWR is defined as,
SWR=10 log10
N1−1∑
n1=0
N2−1∑
n2=0
f 2a (n1, n2)
N1−1∑
n1=0
N2−1∑
n2=0
{
fa(n1, n2) − fˆa(n1, n2)
}2 [dB]. (3.12)
Here, D is given as
D =
12N2σ
N2σ + 3M
2
σ
, (3.13)
where T
Q2
D
is the distortion in each block by watermarking. D is set to make
sure that watermarking can be extracted without original image, then distortion in
each Bx × By-sized block can be derived as TQ2/D. Details can be found in the
chapter [60]. Positive number Nσ is chosen to satisfy
∣∣∣wi,l − w¯i∣∣∣ ≤ Nσσw. (3.14)
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Table 3.1: Piece size and watermark length in conventional scheme 2 [53] (Bx =
By = 8 and T = 1).
Image
Reshaped I2 Embeddable watermark
[pixels] L [bits]
Airplane 64 × 1920 1920
Baboon 64 × 1880 1880
Lena 64 × 1892 1892
Peppers 64 × 1768 1768
Sailboat 64 × 1970 1970
R, Bx, By, Nσ, Mσ, and w¯i are common in the trading system. For binary se-
quence wi, consumer i is identified by decoding wˆi = {wˆi,l}. For other sequences
such as Gaussian sequence, consumer i is identified by a correlation-based detec-
tor in which cross correlations between wˆi and all possible sequences are calcu-
lated, as well as mechanism [58, 59] used in the conventional scheme [53].
Performance
In order to confirm the effectiveness of proposed scheme, the above mentioned
data hiding technique [60] is used in the conventional scheme 2 [53] and the pro-
posed scheme under the condition that one coefficient from a 8 × 8-sized DCT
block is used for watermarking (Bx = By = 8 and T = 1). That is, the same
embedding technique is used in two different image decomposition schemes. It is
noted that the literature [53] says the conventional 2 is better than the conventional
1 [48–52], so the conventional scheme 1 is not evaluated here.
Five 512 × 512-sized 8-bits grayscale images are used for evaluation, namely,
‘Airplane,’ ‘Baboon,’ ‘Lena,’ ’Peppers,’ and ‘Sailboat.’ Saliency varies from im-
age to image, so the embedding capacity for salience regions also fluctuates as
shown in Table 3.1. Based on Table 3.1 and making wi a L-bits binary sequence
consisting of equiprobable zeros and ones, σw, Mσ and Nσ are set to 0.5, 0.5, and
1, respectively.
Table 3.2 shows the averaged correct extracting rate of embedded fingerprint
against several attacks provided by StirMark [62, 63] and compression by JPEG
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Table 3.2: Averaged correct extracting rate of hidden fingerprints against several
attacks provided by StirMark [62, 63] and JPEG 2000 compression [64]1.
(a) Desired signal-to-watermark ratio R is 25 dB.
Attack Conventional scheme 2 [53] Proposed scheme
CONV 74.80% 83.15%
JPEG 94.34% 95.86%
MEDIAN 85.11% 94.31%
ROTSCALE 51.01% 66.40%
FMLR 80.87% 88.75%
JPEG 2000 89.78% 94.11%
(b) Desired signal-to-watermark ratio R is 30 dB.
Attack Conventional scheme 2 [53] Proposed scheme
CONV 69.62% 80.44%
JPEG 86.53% 91.03%
MEDIAN 74.88% 83.57%
ROTSCALE 50.32% 58.24%
FMLR 66.35% 74.59%
JPEG 2000 82.36% 85.41%
Table 3.3: Quantization steps Q for the same desired SWR (R = 25 [dB]).
Image Conventional scheme 2 [53] Proposed scheme
Airplane 90 160
Baboon 132 144
Lena 85 149
Peppers 84 146
Sailboat 83 150
2000 [64]. The same L-bits watermark is hidden to the piece per image in both
schemes and the desired SWR for two schemes are the same. From Table 3.2, it
was found that the proposed scheme is superior to the conventional scheme 2 [53]
in terms of the averaged correct extracting rate of hidden fingerprint.
Because the image sent to TTP is relatively larger in the proposed scheme
than that in the conventional scheme 2 [53], the actual embedding strength which
is given by quantization step Q in the proposed scheme is relatively larger for the
same SWR as shown in Table 3.3. This explains why the proposed scheme is more
robust than the conventional scheme 2 [53] as shown in Table 3.2. As mentioned
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Table 3.4: SWR improvement in the proposed scheme when quantization steps of
conventional scheme 2 [53] shown in Table 3.3 are used.
Image Quantization step Q SWR [dB]
Airplane 90 42
Baboon 132 37
Lena 85 38
Peppers 84 37
Sailboat 83 36
above, the literature [53] says the conventional scheme 2 [53] is more robust than
the conventional scheme 1 [48–52]. So, it is concluded that the proposed scheme
is the best among three schemes in terms of copyright protection.
It is noted the proposed scheme can improve the quality of watermarked im-
ages instead of robustness improvement. With quantization steps Q shown in
Table 3.3 which are for conventional scheme 2 [53], the averaged SWR in the
proposed scheme becomes 38 dB as shown in Table 3.4 whereas R = 25 [dB] in
conventional scheme 2.
3.5 Conclusions
This chapter has proposed a use of amplitude-only images for privacy- and copyright-
protected image trading systems. Amplitude-only images which are passed to the
trusted third parties (TTPs) are unrecognizable in the proposed scheme, whereas
the images in which valuable content are left are passed to the TPP in the conven-
tional scheme [48–53]. So consumer’s privacy is protected from accidental leak-
age of them from the TTPs in the proposed system. Phase-only images are recog-
nizable, and a consumer can confirm the content which he/she bought. Since most
of data hiding techniques modify the amplitude component of images, almost any
arbitrary techniques can be used in the proposed scheme where robustness de-
1CONV: average of attacks with 3 × 3 Gaussian filter and those with 3 × 3 sharpening filter.
JPEG: average of compression with parameter 10, 20 ,30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80 and 90. MEDIAN:
average of attacks with 2×2, 3×3, and 4×4 median filters. ROTSCALE: average of rotation with
0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 1.00 degrees with cropping and scaling. FMLR: Frequency mode Laplacian
removal. JPEG2000: average of compression ratio 0.5, 0.1, and 0.05.
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pends on the fingerprinting technique itself. With a block DCT-based data hiding
technique [60], it was found that the proposed scheme is superior to the conven-
tional schemes [48–53] in terms of the robustness against attacks to watermarked
images provided by StirMark [62, 63] and compression by JPEG 2000, because
the size of the image to be watermarked is larger than that in the conventional
schemes.
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(a) Original image ‘I.’ (b) Saliency map [54] of ‘I.’
(c) Binarized saliency map. (d) Block-based saliency map.
(e) Piece ‘I1.’ (f) Piece ‘I2.’
(g) Reshaped ‘I2’.
Figure 3.5: Images in the conventional scheme 2 [53].
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Figure 3.6: Block diagram of the proposed scheme.
(a) Original image f.
(b) Amplitude-only image fa. (c) Phase-only image fp.
Figure 3.7: Amplitude-only and phase-only images.
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Figure 3.8: Block diagram of watermark technique [60].
Chapter 4
Compression-friendly Image
Trading System for Copyright- and
Privacy-Protection
4.1 Introduction
In order to protect the copyright held by content providers (CPs) and the privacy
of consumers in trading images, a new framework has been proposed [52]; an im-
age is divided into two pieces by a CP where one is directly sent to a consumer
from the CP and the other is fingerprinted by a trusted third party (TTP) before the
consumer receives it. The consumer obtains the fingerprinted image by combin-
ing two received pieces. By doing so, the TTP knows only a part of the content.
However, in conventional systems dividing images in the spatial domain [52, 53],
an adversary has a possibility to estimate the original image from the piece which
is leaked from a TTP, and a fingerprint for copyright protection can only cover
a half of the image. The latest system separates an image into an unintelligible
amplitude-only image (AOI) and a visible phase-only image (POI) to solve these
problems [55], where the AOI and POI are inversely transformed amplitude and
phase components of discrete Fourier transformed (DFTed) coefficients of the im-
age, respectively. However, this system does not take compression into account,
and it is quite difficult to efficiently compress AOIs.
49
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4.2 Conventional Schemes and Those Problems
In conventional scheme [55], an image purchased by a consumer is divided into
an AOI and a POI by using the DFT. The AOI is fingerprinted by a TTP and the
POI is directly sent to a consumer; This system reduces the potential information
leakage at TTPs by introducing AOIs which are unintelligible. The POI is too
distorted to be of commercial value, but the POI reveals the original image and it
is useful for consumers to confirm the received image.
Images may be compressed for transmission between a CP and a TTP and
between the TTP and a consumer in practical scenarios, conventional system [55]
has never taken compression into account.
4.3 Proposed Scheme
This section proposes an efficient compression scheme of AOIs for the copyright-
and privacy-protected image trading system. As shown in Fig. 4.1, the proposed
scheme applies the DCT instead of DFT to an original image for generating the
AOI, where the phase component of DCT coefficients are the positive and nega-
tive signs, i.e., ±1, which can be transmitted with one bit per coefficient without
compression. By multiplying random signs to the amplitude component of DCT
coefficients, the scheme compresses AOIs efficiently.
The image decomposition, quantization and compression, digital fingerprint-
ing, image composition, and fingerprint extraction in the proposed scheme are
described in the subsequent sections and the feature of the proposed scheme is
then summarized.
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4.3.1 Compression-Friendly Image Decomposition
Firstly, a CP divides N1 × N2-sized original image f = { f (n1, n2)} to N1 × N2-
sized AOI f′a =
{
f ′a(n1, n2)
}
and N1 × N2-sized phase components Fp =
{
Fp(k1, k2)
}
where n1 = 0, 1, . . . ,N1 − 1, n2 = 0, 1, . . . ,N2 − 1, k1 = 0, 1, . . . ,N1 − 1, and
k2 = 0, 1, . . . ,N2 − 1.
1. The CP applies two-dimensional (2D) DCT to f to get N1 × N2-sized 2D-
DCT coefficients F = {F(k1, k2)};
F(k1, k2) =
α(k1)α(k2)
N1−1∑
n1=0
N2−1∑
n2=0
f (n1, n2)C(n1, k1,N1)C(n2, k2,N2), (4.1)
where
α(k1) =

√
1/N1, k1 = 0
√
2/N1, otherwise
, (4.2)
α(k2) =

√
1/N2, k2 = 0
√
2/N2, otherwise
, (4.3)
C(n1, k1,N1) = cos
(2n1 + 1)k1pi
2N1
, (4.4)
C(n2, k2,N2) = cos
(2n2 + 1)k2pi
2N2
. (4.5)
2. Separate real numbered DCT coefficients F into amplitude componentsFa =
{Fa(k1, k2)} and phase components Fp as
Fa(k1, k2) = |F(k1, k2)| , (4.6)
Fp(k1, k2) = sgn (F(k1, k2)) , (4.7)
where Fa(k1, k2) and Fp(k1, k2) are amplitude and phase component of F(k1, k2),
respectively, and sgn(·) returns the positive and negative sign of the input.
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It is noted that
F(k1, k2) = Fa(k1, k2)Fp(k1, k2). (4.8)
3. N1 × N2-sized random matrix R = {R(k1, k2)} which consists of ±1 is multi-
plied to Fa as
F′a = Fa ◦ R, (4.9)
where ◦ represents Hadamard product.
4. Applying the inverse 2D DCT (2D-IDCT) to F′a generates AOI f
′
a, where
2D-IDCT of F is defined as
f (n1, n2) =
N1−1∑
k1=0
N2−1∑
k2=0
α(k1)α(k2)F(k1, k2)C(n1, k1,N1)C(n2, k2,N2). (4.10)
4.3.2 Quantization and Compression
AOI f′a consisting of real numbers is processed to be transferred to a TTP from the
CP; quantization as Q1 shown in Fig. 4.1 and compression.
1. Quantize AOI f′a to an image with K-bit integers.
2. Compress quantized AOI.
3. The CP sends quantized and compressed AOI to the TTP, whereas the CP
sends phase components Fp to a consumer.
It is noted that any arbitrary quantization and image compression techniques
can be employed here in the proposed scheme. In addition, phase component
Fp are just positive and negative signs in the proposed scheme, i.e., one bit per
coefficient, the CP sends Fp to a consumer efficiently even without compression.
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(a) Airplane. (b) Baboon. (c) Lena.
(d) Peppers. (e) Sailboat.
Figure 4.2: Five 512 × 512-sized 8-bit grayscale images for evaluation.
4.3.3 Digital Fingerprinting
The TTP hides the consumer’s fingerprint w to received AOI.
1. The TTP decompress and inversely quantizes the received image to obtain
f′′a =
{
f ′′a (n1, n2)
}
.
2. Hide w into f′′a and watermarked AOI f
′′
wa =
{
f ′′wa(n1, n2)
}
is generated.
3. Quantize as Q2 shown in Fig. 4.1 and compress f′′wa for sending it to the
consumer.
It is noted that any arbitrary digital fingerprinting technique which hides data
to the amplitude components of the image can be used in the proposed scheme,
as an implementation [59] of a well-known spread spectrum-based technique [58]
is used in conventional system 1 [53] and as an image quality guaranteed tech-
nique [60, 61] is used in conventional system 2 [55].
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Table 4.1: Range of amplitude-only image fa and random-sign image f
′
a.
Image Airplane Baboon Lena Peppers Sailboat
fa 7192 9851 7134 6490 8490
f′a 403 331 383 378 477
4.3.4 Image Composition
The consumer gets N1 × N2-sized watermarked image fˆw =
{
fˆw(n1, n2)
}
from re-
ceived two pieces.
1. Decompress and inversely quantized the received watermarked-quantized-
compressed AOI to obtain watermarked AOI fˆwa =
{
fˆwa(n1, n2)
}
.
2. Apply 2D-DCT to fˆwa to generate amplitude components Fˆwa =
{
Fˆwa(k1, k2)
}
.
3. Multiply R to Fˆwa as Fˆwa ◦ R.
4. Combine the above processed amplitude components and received Fp to
form watermarked DCT coefficients.
5. Apply 2D-IDCT to the watermarked DCT coefficients to get watermarked
image fˆw.
4.3.5 Fingerprint Extraction
From a suspected image which is identical or similar to fˆw, the TTP extracts the
fingerprinting as follows,
1. Apply 2D-DCT to the suspected image to get amplitude component F¯wa.
2. Apply 2D-IDCT to F¯wa ◦R to get image f¯w.
3. Extract fingerprinting w from f¯w.
By comparing the extracted fingerprinting with the fingerprinting stored at the
TTP, the malicious consumer can be identified.
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4.3.6 Features
Besides the same features as conventional system 2 [55] that an AOI is unintelli-
gible and has the same size as the original image, the main feature of the proposed
scheme is efficient compression of two separated pieces. This feature is achieved
by introducing the DCT and random signs.
The 2D-DCT is used in the proposed scheme whereas conventional system 2 [55]
employes the 2D-DFT, even the proposed scheme separates an original image in
a transformed domain as well as conventional system 2. The POI in conventional
system 2 consists of real numbers, so it should be quantized and compressed to
be transmitted from a CP to a consumer. In contrast, the phase components in the
proposed scheme consist of just positive and negative signs, i.e., ±1, so it can be
transmitted with one bit per coefficient without quantization and compression.
As shown in Table 4.1, the ranges of random-sign images are about
1
30
∼
1
20
ranges of amplitude-only images. Random sign dramatically reduces the range of
AOI, because initial phases are randomized so that the sum peak of initial phases is
reduced. The proposed scheme efficiently compress unintelligible AOIs, whereas
it is generally hard to compress perceptually encrypted images efficiently. The
scheme applies random signs to amplitude component of 2D-DCT coefficients
of the original image before applying 2D-IDCT to the amplitude component to
generate an AOI. Random signs reduce quantization and compression errors of
AOIs. That is, an efficient compression of AOIs is achieved. It is noted that AOIs
in the proposed scheme are still unintelligible, so the consumers’ privacy are well
protected as conventional system 2 does [55].
4.4 Experimental Results
By using five grayscale images shown in Fig. 4.2, this section confirms that piece
Fp which is directly sent to a consumer and piece fa which is sent to a TTP to be
watermarked have the following properties in the proposed scheme:
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(a) AOI fa of Fig. 3.5 (a). (b) POI fp of Fig. 3.5 (a). (c) Phase components Fp of
Fig. 3.5 (a).
Figure 4.3: Images in the proposed scheme. Images are based on 2D-DCT.
1. Original image f can be recognized from fp.
2. Piece fp has no commercial value.
3. No one can estimate original image f from fa.
4. Two pieces are efficiently compressed.
5. A TTP can embed a fingerprint into piece fa robustly to quantization and
compression.
1), 2), and 3) are discussed in Section 4.4.1, 4) and 5) are discussed in Sec-
tions 4.4.2 and 4.4.3, respectively.
4.4.1 Unrecognizability and Recognizability of Pieces
Figures 4.3 (a) and (b) showAOI fa and POI fp of the proposed scheme for original
image f shown in Fig. 3.5 (a), respectively. It is noted that fp is easily obtained by
applying 2D-IDCT to phase component Fp shown in Fig. 4.3 (c).
1) As shown in Fig. 4.3 (b), the edge of the original image is left, so original
image f can be recognized. In this way, the consumer can confirm the image he/
she bought as well as in conventional system 2 [55].
2) Piece fp only reveals the edges of the original image as shown in Fig. 4.3 (b),
it obviously has no commercial value as well as in conventional system 2.
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3) As shown in Fig. 4.3 (a), it is quite hard to estimate original image f from
AOI fa as well as conventional system 2. In contrast, there is a chance that es-
timation of f from piece ‘I2’ is successful in spatial domain-based conventional
systems [52, 53].
It is concluded that the proposed scheme protects consumer’s privacy against
accidental information leakage from the TTP as well as conventional system 2 [55].
4.4.2 Compression Performance
Here, a simple linear quantizer given as
q(n1, n2) = round
(
f (n1, n2) −minn1,n2 f (n1, n2)
s
)
, (4.11)
s =
maxn1 ,n2 f (n1, n2) −minn1,n2 f (n1, n2)
2K − 1 , (4.12)
Q(n1, n2) = sq(n1, n2) +minn1,n2 f (n1, n2), (4.13)
is employed for quantizing AOIs and POIs, where q(n1, n2) ∈ [0, 2K − 1] and
Q(n1, n2) are quantized and inversely quantized images of f (n1, n2), respectively.
A set of rounding real numbers to integers and clipping integers into [0, 2K − 1] is
compared with the quantizer.
Kakadu [64], a JPEG 2000 codec, is used for compression/decompression of
quantized AOIs and POIs here. Compression rate c is given as c = ca + cp where
ca and cp are the compression rate for an AOI and a POI, respectively. It is noted
that cp is always one in the proposed scheme as mentioned in Section 4.3.2.
Figure 4.4 shows the peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) between reconstructed
and original ‘Lena’. Note that fingerprints are not hidden into AOIs here. From
Fig. 4.4, the simple linear quantization is obviously superior to rounding and clip-
ping. In addition, regardless of quantization technique, random signs drastically
improve the quality of reconstructed images. Moreover, a perceptual encryption
by random permutation of the original image degrades compression performance
because of the loss of the correlation between neighboring pixels, whereas the
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Figure 4.4: PSNR’s of reconstructed ‘Lena’. The proposed scheme using the
quantization and the random signs is the best.
correlation partially remains in an AOI.
The PSNR’s averaged over five test images are evaluated in the proposed
scheme and conventional system 2 [55], where ca = cp = c/2 for conventional
system 2. It is confirmed from Fig. 4.5 that the proposed scheme (DCT with
random signs) is superior to conventional system 2 (DFT without random signs).
From the figure, it is also confirmed that introducing random signs much improves
the compression efficiency.
It is concluded that the proposed scheme compresses fa and Fp efficiently, i.e.,
property 4) is satisfied.
4.4.3 Fingerprinting Performance
The robustness of fingerprinting is compared between the proposed scheme and
conventional system 1 [53], because the previous section shows that the quality
of reconstructed images in conventional system 2 [55] is too degraded. Even any
arbitrary fingerprinting technique can be used in the proposed scheme and con-
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Figure 4.5: PSNR’s comparison between the proposed scheme (DCT with ran-
dom signs) and conventional system 2 [55] (DFT without random signs). The
quantizer is used.
ventional system 1 as mentioned in Section 4.3.3, the image quality-guaranteed
data hiding technique [60, 61] employed for performance evaluation in the liter-
ature [55] is used here. This technique can control the energy of a watermark
sequence, and this section utilizes this feature of the technique to set the PSNR of
watermarked images the same regardless of scheme or system. It is noteworthy
that the fingerprinting performance depends on the used fingerprinting technique.
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show the fingerprinting performance of the proposed scheme
and conventional system 1 [53] where the embedding strength for each image are
the same between tables. Total compression ratio c is set to 5 bits per pixel (bpp)
for keeping watermarked images with high quality in Table 4.2 where two pieces
are equally compressed with 2.5 bpp in conventional system 1 and an AOI is com-
pressed with 4 bpp and the phase component is sent with 1 bpp in the proposed
scheme. The payload size which is the length of a binary fingerprint fluctuates
according to images, but those of the proposed scheme and conventional system 1
are set to be the same.
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Table 4.2: Fingerprinting performance comparisons. Compression rate c = 5
[bpp]. BER: bit error rate.
Payload Proposed Conventional
Image size scheme system 1 [53]
[bits] PSNR [dB] BER [%] PSNR [dB] BER [%]
Airplane 1920 44.34 0.0 44.05 0.0
Baboon 1880 40.24 0.0 40.14 0.0
Lena 1892 44.44 0.0 44.12 0.0
Peppers 1768 45.08 0.0 44.41 0.0
Sailboat 1970 42.90 0.0 42.88 0.0
Table 4.3: Fingerprinting performance of the proposed scheme. The payload size
and embedding strength are the same as those in Table 4.2.
Image
Total compression rate c [bpp]
2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
Airplane
PSNR [dB] 38.42 40.33 42.23 42.98 43.74 44.34
BER [%] 41.3 19.6 12.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Baboon
PSNR [dB] 30.00 32.14 34.30 36.64 38.57 40.24
BER [%] 46.9 46.4 30.4 25.9 5.8 0.0
Lena
PSNR [dB] 39.17 40.76 42.37 43.18 44.32 44.44
BER [%] 32.9 12.7 11.9 1.8 0.0 0.0
Peppers
PSNR [dB] 37.37 39.17 40.64 42.36 44.13 45.08
BER [%] 43.7 21.7 14.3 4.7 0.0 0.0
Sailboat
PSNR [dB] 35.08 37.18 38.87 40.39 41.66 42.90
BER [%] 47.2 33.4 20.8 20.3 2.3 0.0
It is found from Table 4.2 that the proposed scheme is comparable to con-
ventional system 1 [53] in terms of the PSNR of watermarked image and the
robustness to image compression. Watermarked images in conventional system 1,
however, have a severe security problem; the watermarked areas which belong to
piece ‘I2’ are revealed as shown in Fig. 4.6 (a). Conventional system 1 divides
an original image into two pieces in the spatial domain which only piece ‘I2’ is
watermarked and piece ‘I1’ is left as is [53], and it makes watermarked areas rec-
ognizable. So, there is a chance for a malicious consumer to remove or corrupt
the hidden fingerprint.
Table 4.3 shows an example of fingerprinting performance in the proposed
scheme in which the performance gets worse as the compression rate becomes
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(a) Conventional scheme [53].
(b) Proposed scheme.
Figure 4.6: Watermarked images of ‘sailboat’ in conventional system 1 [53] and
the proposed scheme. The PSNR is 42.9 [dB] for both images.
lower. This scheme suppresses the error to 20 % for images with the PSNR over
40 dB even it embeds about 2000 bits data. It should be mentioned again that the
performance depends on the used fingerprinting technique.
It is concluded that the proposed scheme is robust to image compression. That
is, the proposed scheme has property 5). In addition, the proposed scheme takes
compression into account, the proposed scheme makes the image trading system
practical.
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4.5 Conclusions
This chapter has proposed an efficient compression scheme of AOIs for the copyright-
and privacy-protected image trading system. The proposed scheme introduces the
DCT to the piece splitting process so that a CP sends a piece to a consumer with-
out compression, whereas conventional system 2 uses the DFT [55] and the CP
sends a piece to the consumer with quantization and compression. The scheme
further introduces random signs for generation of AOIs so that it reduces quan-
tization and compression error to AOIs. These strategies improve compression
efficiency in comparison to conventional system 2. In addition, it was found that
fingerprinting performance of the proposed scheme is superior to conventional
system 1 [53]. The proposed scheme makes the image trading system practical.
Chapter 5
Cheating Prevention Visual
Cryptography
5.1 Introduction
In recent years, powerful computers offer even ordinary users the encryption of
secret information. To encrypt and decrypt secret information, a key (or a key
pair) is used and should be securely and safely guarded. This straightforward
key protection, however, still has the risk of key loss and leakage. On the other
hand, with the development of fast network technologies, many people collaborate
on secret projects over the public Internet. Information should be secret even a
few member collude to leak the secret information. To overcome such situations,
secret sharing (SS) has been proposed [65].
A SS scheme [65] divides a secret into n pieces referred to as shares. n shares
are held by n different parties and the secret is recovered if and only if k or more
shares are gathered. This scheme is called as a (k, n)-threshold SS scheme. Even
computer technology is highly developed, it is not always possible to use com-
puter. In order to overcome these situations, visual SS (VSS) in which decryption
can be done by human eyes has been proposed for binary images [66].
Later, VSS has been extended to non-binary images [67, 68]. Color VSS have
also been proposed [69–71]. Instead of random share images [66], meaningful
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shares are employed in a scheme [72]. Some schemes [73, 74] allow to embed
multi-secret within one image. A weaken security scheme [75,76] is also proposed
to improve the visuality of recovered image. Other direction reduces the pixel
expansion size and improves the contrast of the recovered image [77, 78].
On the other hand, it is assumed in a scenario that malicious parties deceive
an honest party, and cheat-prevention VSS schemes have been proposed to fight
it [53,79,80,82]. This chapter focuses on cheat-prevention VSS. A literature [81]
found that the original cheat-prevention VSS scheme [80] is not well function in
some circumstances. The literature [81] also proposes a new scheme, but pixel
expansion is sacrificed significantly. Later, the same authors proposed another
scheme [82] with less pixel expansion, but its application is limited to (2, n)-
threshold VSS and it introduces a further restriction.
This chapter proposes a new cheat-prevention VSS scheme which solves the
problem in the original cheat-prevention VSS scheme [80] without sacrificing
pixel expansion. By introducing randomness into share generation, it simultane-
ously overcomes the abovementioned two problems in the conventional schemes [53,
80]. In addition, the proposed scheme can be applied to (k, n)-threshold VSS,
whereas a latest scheme [82] which is only applicable to (2, n)-threshold VSS.
The rest of this chapter is arranged as follows. In Section 5.2, SS [65], VSS [66],
and the concept of cheat-prevention VSS will be reviewed. Conventional cheat-
prevention VSS schemes [53,80,82] are introduced in Section 5.3. The improved
scheme is proposed in Section 5.4. Experimental results are shown in Section 5.5
and conclusions and future works are given in Section 5.6.
5.2 Preliminaries
This section briefly describes secret sharing (SS), visual SS (VSS), and cheat-
prevention VSS.
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5.2.1 Secret Sharing
Here, a (k, n)-threshold SS method [65] in which k of n shares should be gathered
to recover the secret information is described with introducing terms and nota-
tions.
Let P = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} be the set of n parties, and each party Pi holds share
S i where i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Let 2
P be the set of all subsets of P.
Let ΓQ and ΓF be the qualified sets and forbidden sets, respectively. Assume
ΓQ is monotone increasing and ΓF is monotone decreasing. Denote Γ
∗
Q and Γ
∗
F as
the minimum qualified sets and the maximum forbidden sets.
Here,
(
P, ΓQ, ΓF
)
is an access structure if ΓQ∩ΓF = ∅ and ΓQ∪ΓF = 2P. Access
structure
(
P, ΓQ, ΓF
)
for a (k, n)-threshold SS method is that X ∈ ΓQ if and only if
|X| ≥ k, where |X| is the number of parties in X.
5.2.2 Visual Secret Sharing
VSS is a kind of secret sharing [66], so the access structure of VSS is the same as
SS. There are two differences between VSS and SS; 1) images are used as shares
in VSS and 2) decryption needs no computations, it is done by human eyes of
watching stacked share images.
Let S0 and S1 be the n×m-sized basic matrices for the share image generation
in a black-and-white VSS method where S0 and S1 are for white and black pixels,
respectively. For example, in the original (k, n)-threshold VSS method [66] in
which a pixel in a secret image is expanded to m subpixels in share image S i, S
0
and S1 are given as
S0 =

1 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 0
 and S
1 =

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
 (5.1)
under the condition that n = m = 3 and k = 2. Each party Pi holds share image S i
where i = 1, 2, . . . , n. This (2, 3)-threshold VSS method generates share image S i
as
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Figure 5.1: An example of the (2, 3)-threshold visual secret sharing method for
binary images [66]. A pixel in the secret image is expanded to three subpixels in
a share image, i.e., m = 3.
1. For each white pixel in the secret image, put the i-th row of S0 to S i as m-
length subpixels.
2. For each black pixel in the secret image, put the i-th row of S1 to S i as m-
length subpixels.
Figure 5.1 shows an example for this (2, 3)-threshold VSS method [66].
In general, a VSS method is expected to meet the following requirements.
1. The increase in pixel expansion should be as small as possible.
2. The contrast of the secret image in the stacking of shares is not significantly
reduced.
3. It does not rely on the help of an on-line trusted authority.
5.2.3 Cheat-Prevention Visual Secret Sharing
In normal VSS methods, two or more parties can collude to generate fake shares.
For example, as shown in Eq. (5.1), subpixels corresponding to a white pixel are
[1 0 0] regardless of party Pi in the (2, 3)-threshold VSS scheme with m = 3. In
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addition, when two parties collude, S1 can be easily estimated from subpixels in
their shares which subpixels correspond to black pixels. Now, colluded two parties
know S0 and S1, they can generate a fake share to deceive the other party. In this
scenario, the fake secret image is revealed by stacking the fake shares and share
(shares) from honest party (parties) as shown in Fig. 5.2. In order to overcome
this situation, cheat-prevention VSS have been proposed [53, 80].
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It is noted that the above cheat is successful when Req. 1 is satisfied. The
more the pixel is expanded in the VSS method, the harder the cheat becomes. For
example, in the (2, 3)-threshold VSS scheme with m = 4, S0 and S1 are given as
S0 =

1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
 and S
1 =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
 . (5.2)
When two parties are collusive to cheat, S0 can be estimated, but S1 can’t be re-
vealed, i.e., the cheat becomes harder. However, the contrast of revealed secret
image becomes quite low by increasing the number of subpixels; being uncom-
pliant with Req. 1 becomes uncompliant with Req. 2. Both conventional and
proposed cheat-prevention VSS described in this chapter meet Req. 1.
A successful cheat-prevention VSS prevents any party from deceiving an hon-
est party, and it is summarized [80] that an efficient and robust cheat-prevention
scheme should has the following properties in addition to Reqs. 1, 2, and 3:
4. Each party verifies shares presented by other participants.
5. The verification image of each party is different and confidential.
6. A cheat-prevention scheme should be applicable to any VSS method.
5.3 Conventional Cheat-Prevention VSS Schemes
This section reviews two conventional schemes [53,80] for cheat-prevention VSS.
In a cheat-prevention VSS, each of all n parties P holds two images for satisfying
Req. 4; one (share image S i) is for secret recovery and the other (verification
image share Vi) is for verification.
Before revealing the secret image, party Pi can check others’ share image S j
by stacking Vi and S j, i.e., Vi + S j where j = 1, 2, . . . , n and j ! i. If this stacked
image
(
Vi + S j
)
reveals verification image Vi of Pi, which is set in advance, share
CHAPTER 5: Cheating Prevention Visual Cryptography 71
image S j is judged to be authentic, if not, S j is forged. It is noted that verification
image Vi of Pi should be know to Pi only.
5.3.1 Conventional Scheme 1
Based on given S0 and S1 which are the n×m-sized basic matrices for share image
generation in a black-and-white VSS method, this scheme [80] firstly creates four
n × (m + 2)-sized basic matrices T0, T1, R0, and R1 as
T0 =

10
... S0
10
 ,T
1 =

10
... S1
10
 , (5.3)
R0 =

10
... 0
10
 ,R
1 =

01
... 0
01
 , (5.4)
where T0 and T1 are used for generating share S i and R
0 and R1 are used for
generating verification image share Vi, respectively.
This scheme generates share image S i as follows:
1. For each white pixel in the secret image, put the i-th row of T0 to S i as
(m + 2)-length subpixels.
2. For each black pixel in the secret image, put the i-th row of T1 to S i as
(m + 2)-length subpixels.
According to verification image Vi of party Pi, this scheme generates verification
image share Vi as follows:
1. For each white pixel in Vi, put the i-th row of R0 to Vi as (m + 2)-length
subpixels.
2. For each black pixel in Vi, put the i-th row of R1 to Vi as (m + 2)-length
subpixles.
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By adding two columns consisting of one 0 and one 1 to S0 and S1, stacking
shares by colluded parties cannot disclose S0 or S1. In addition, a generation of
fake shares with taking account into the verification image share of the honest
party (parties) becomes much harder. It is noted that columns in T0, T1, R0, and
R1 are differently permuted at each pixel of the secret image before generating
share images to be more secure.
Figure 5.3 shows an example of this cheat-prevention VSS scheme [80] when
it is applied to (2, 3)-threshold VSS [66]. It is shown that party Pi can see his/her
own verification image Vi by stacking Vi and S j where S j is the image share from
party Pj. It is also shown that stacking shares shows the secret image.
5.3.2 Conventional Scheme 2
It was found that cheat-prevention in conventional scheme 1 [80] described in the
previous section is breakable when adversaries use complementary verification
images [81]. As shown in Eq. (5.4), verification image share Vi has subpixels in
which the first column is ‘1’ for white pixels and subpixels in which the second
column is ‘1’ for black pixels. All other (m+1) columns are zeros. From this fact,
if two complementary verification images are used by two malicious parties, they
can fool conventional scheme 1.
A tangible example is given here with three parties P1, P2, and P3 in the con-
ventional scheme 1 on (2, 3)-threshold VSS with Eq. (5.1). It is assumed that P1
and P2 are collusive cheaters and P3 is the victim. Column permutation of T
0, T1,
R0, and R1 are omitted here for simplicity, and the permutation does not prevent
P1 and P2 from deceiving P3. The attack is illustrated as follow:
1. P1 and P2 choose complimentary verification images V
1 and V2 as shown
in Fig. 5.4 (a) and (b), respectively.
2. Each party receives the share and verification image shares.
3. P1 and P2 stack their verification image shares V1 and V2 to determine the
positions of the added columns inR0 and R1 by focusing the position of ‘1.’
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It is easily determined that the first and second columns are added to zero
matrices to form R0 and R1 as shown in Eq. (5.4).
4. The basic matrices T0 and T1 can be uniquely determined because the first
and second rows of T0 and T1 which for S 1 and S 2 are known and the
positions of the added columns in T0 and T1 which are the same as those in
R0 and R1 are known.
5. Subpixels in S 3 are now determined from the third row of T
0 and T1.
6. According to the third row ofT0 and T1 and the positions of added columns,
fake share images F1 and F2 which for P1 and P2, respectively, can be
forged.
As shown in Figs. 5.4 (g) and (h), P3 confirms own verification image V
3
(shown in Fig. 5.4 (c)) from V3 + F1 and V3 + F2 as from V3 + S 3 shown in
Fig. 5.4 (f). However, S 3 + F1 and S 3 + F2 reveal the fake secret image (shown
in Fig. 5.4 (e)) instead of the secret image (shown in Fig. 5.4 (d)) as shown in
Figs. 5.4 (i) and (j).
From the fact clarified in the literature [81], another requirement is further
introduced to cheat-prevention scheme:
7. Added columns cannot be estimated even collusive cheaters use compli-
mentary verification images.
The literature [81] has proposed a scheme to meet Req.7 where the scheme is
referred to as conventional scheme 2 in this chapter. In order to foil up u collusive
cheaters, (u + 1) of zero columns and one of 1 column, i.e., (u + 2) columns
are added to the basic matrices with m-columns. This remedy is considered as
increasing the columns of basic matrices, and it is achieved at the cost of higher
pixel expansion which is against Reqs. 1 and 2 as shown in Fig. 5.5, and the
literature also points out this problem by itself [81].
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5.3.3 Conventional Scheme 3
A new visual structure called ‘black pattern’ is introduced to the conventional
scheme [82] to prevent cheating between participants. A black pattern is a rectan-
gle filled with black pixels and some black patterns appear by stacking verification
image share Vi and share image S j as shown in Figs. 5.6 (g), (h), and (i). It is noted
that the dealer instead of participants decides the number and positions of black
patterns for each participant.
This conventional scheme 3 [82] has two disadvantages: The scheme is only
applicable to (2, n)-threshold VSS and participants are not allowed to choose their
verification images freely. The former does not satisfy Req.6, whereas conven-
tional schemes 1 [80] and 2 [81] meet Req.6. On the latter, this kind of limitation
can prevent collusive cheaters from estimating added columns even in conven-
tional scheme 1 [80]; Cheaters cannot choose complimentary verification images
freely under such limitation.
The next section proposes a new cheat-prevention VSS scheme which over-
comes the problems: Req. 7 is not satisfied (in conventional scheme [80]) and
Req. 1 is not satisfied (in conventional scheme 2 [81]). In addition, the proposed
scheme is applicable to (k, n)-threshold VSS.
5.4 Proposed Scheme
This section gives details of the proposed scheme in which randomness is intro-
duced to share generation instead of increasing the number of columns of basic
matrices for meeting Req. 7; preventing cheaters with complimentary verification
images from estimating added columns. Let S0 and S1 be the n × m-sized basic
matrices for share generation in a black-and-white VSS method in which each
party Pi holds share image S i where i = 1, 2, . . . , n and a pixel in a secret image is
expanded to m subpixels in a share image.
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5.4.1 Algorithm
Firstly, the proposed scheme creates four n × (m + 2)-sized basic matrices T0,
T1, R0, and R1 as the same as conventional scheme 1 [80], i.e., as Eqs. (5.3) and
(5.4). In addition, party-dependent (m + 2)-length row vector r0i is obtained from
t0i which is the i-th row of T
0 where i = {1, 2, . . . , n};
t0i =
[
1 0 s0i
]
, (5.5)
where s0i is the i-th row of S
0. With the assumption that the number of 1’s in s0i is
l where 0 < l < m, the number of 1’s in t0i is (l + 1). One 1 is randomly chosen
from (l + 1) of 1’s, and l of 1’s are set to zero to obtain new (m + 2)-length row
vector r0i which contains exact one 1 at each pixel of the verification image.
Then, T0 and T1 are used for generating share images S i as in the conventional
schemes [53,80]. In contrast, according to the pixel value of secret and verification
images, verification image share generation can be divided into 4 cases as,
1. The focal pixel in the secret and verification images are black.
2. The focal pixel in the secret and verification images are black and white,
respectively.
3. The focal pixel in the secret and verification images are white and black,
respectively.
4. The focal pixel in the secret and verification images are white.
Each (m + 2)-length subpixels in verification image share Vi are generated as fol-
lows:
Cases 1, 2, or 3 Use R0 and R1 as in the conventional scheme 1 [80]. That is, put
the i-th row of R0 and R1 to Vi as (m + 2)-length subpixels, for white and
black pixels in verification image Vi, respectively.
Case 4 Put party-dependent row vector r0i to Vi as (m + 2)-length subpixels.
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5.4.2 Example
A tangible example of the proposed scheme is given by using (2, 3)-threshold VSS
method with Eq. (5.1). Then, from Eqs. (5.1) and (5.3), T0 is given as
T0 =

10
... S0
10
 =

1 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 0
 , (5.6)
and t0i = [1 0 1 0 0] regardless of i. The proposed scheme randomly replaces
1’s in t0i with 0 to generate party-dependent row vector r
0
i :
r0i =
[
1 0 0 0 0
]
or r0i =
[
0 0 1 0 0
]
. (5.7)
When malicious parties try to attack the proposed scheme based on the de-
scription in Section 5.3.2, i.e., with complementary verification images, expanded
subpixels in stacked verification image shares of maliciousparties are either [1 1 0 0 0]
or [0 1 1 0 0]. So, it is impossible to identify the position of added columns ex-
actly in the proposed scheme.
5.4.3 Discussion
This section discusses the pixel expansion efficiency and decrypt-able randomness
of the proposed scheme.
Pixel Expansion Efficiency
Assume that w columns are added to n × m-sized base matrices of VSS method
to create two n × (m + w)-sized base matrices in a cheat-prevention VSS scheme
where w ≥ 1.
To meet Req. 1, it is desired that w = 1, and the size of pixel expansion is
m + w = m + 1. Then, the added column must be a zero vector, because stacking
verification image share Vi and share image S j (Vi + S j) should become either
black or white where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and i ! j. On the other hand, if the added
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column consists of one, a white pixel of verification image Vi becomes black
when Vi and S j are stacked.
When w = 1, a black pixel of Vi is expanded to (m + 1)-length subpixels
consisting of one of 1 and m of zeros in verification image share Vi and a white
pixel of Vi is expanded to subpixels compounded of (m + 1) of zeros in Vi. That
is, Vi leaks V
i without stacking with S j. It goes against Req. 5. So, the number of
added columns are at least two, i.e., w ≥ 2.
From this perspective, the proposed scheme which adds two columns to n×m-
sized basic matrices achieves the most efficient pixel expansion, i.e., the proposed
scheme satisfies Req. 1. So, the proposed scheme overcomes the problem in con-
ventional scheme 2 [81].
Decrypt-Able Randomness
As discussed in Section 5.4.3, the most efficient pixel expansion is to add 2
columns to n × m-sized basic matrices. It is assumed again that Eq. (5.1) is used,
then, from Eqs. (5.3) and (5.4), T0, T1, R0, and R1 are as follows:
T0 =

1 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 0
 , T
1 =

1 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 1
 , (5.8)
R0 =

1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
 , R
1 =

0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
 . (5.9)
In conventional scheme 1 [80], it is easy to tell that the proportion of white pixels
to black pixels is 3/2 in each 5-length subpixels in Vi + S j, if the corresponding
pixel in Vi is white. In contrast, the proportion is 2/3, if the corresponding pixel
in Vi is black. Note that the proportion doesn’t change even a column permutation
is applied to matrices.
In case 4 which is defined in Section 5.4.1, 5-length subpixels in Vi are [1 0 | 0 0 0],
those in S j [1 0 | 1 0 0], and thus Vi + S j becomes [1 0 | 1 0 0] in conven-
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tional scheme 1 [80] where i ! j. Meanwhile, r0i could be either [1 0 | 0 0 0] or
[0 0 | 1 0 0] in the proposed scheme by introducing randomness, even the pro-
motion of white pixels to black pixels in 5-length subpixels in Vi+S j is 2/3, i.e., it
is decrypt-able even randomness is introduced. For other cases, randomness could
change the proportion, and it is the reason that randomness is introduced only to
case 4.
As the key point of the attack to conventional scheme 1 [80] is to determine the
position of added columns [81], the proposed scheme introduces randomness in
generating verification image shares to make the accurate estimation of the added
columns impossible, i.e., the proposed scheme meets Req. 7. Thus, the proposed
scheme overcomes the problem in conventional scheme 1 [80].
Accidental Correct Estimation of Added Columns
Though it is quite difficult, there is a possibility that random guessing gives the
correct estimation of the positions of added columns in the proposed scheme and
even in conventional scheme 2 [81]. It is assumed here that verification and secret
images randomly consist of equiprobable white and black pixels. The proposed
scheme introduces randomness to Case 4, and in Case 4 in (2, 3)-threshold VSS,
which was discussed in Section 5.4.2, the possibility of correct guessing of added
columns becomes 1/2. So, for a X × Y-sized image, the possibility of correctly
guessing all positions of added pixels is
(
1
2
) XY
4 . Similarly, that in conventional
scheme 2 [81] is
(
1
18
) XY
2 .
Based on this possibility, the proposed scheme is inferior to conventional
scheme 2 [81]. The proposed scheme, however, is superior in the contrast of
decrypted images to conventional scheme 2. This situation is the same as that
slightly weakening the security could be a choice to improve the visual contrast
in VSS [75, 76].
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5.4.4 Features
The features of the proposed scheme are summarized here.
Cheat-Prevention Functionality Improvement
The problem of conventional scheme 1 [80] is due to all rows in R0 are the same
and simultaneously all rows in R1 are the same. That is, all parties receives ver-
ification image share Vi’s in which subpixels corresponding to black pixels in
verification image Vi are the same regardless of party and simultaneously subpix-
els corresponding to white pixels in Vi are the same regardless of party. This fact
allows malicious parties to collude for deceiving an honest party by using com-
plementary verification images [81]. Conventional scheme 2 [81] expands pixels
much more, whereas the proposed scheme introduces party-dependent subpixels
to Vi’s. Both strategies prevent malicious parties from estimating R
0 and R1, i.e.,
from deceiving an honest party as well.
Consequently, the proposed scheme is superior in the cheat-prevention func-
tionality to conventional scheme 1 [80].
Improvement in Pixel Expansion and Contrast of Recovered Images
The problem of conventional scheme 2 [81] is due to increasing zero columns
to prevent malicious parties from deceiving an honest party, c.f., Figs. 5.3 and
5.5. On the other hand, the proposed scheme simply introduces randomness to
the share generation process. The proposed scheme, thus, keeps the subpixel size
as small as possible and it results in keeping the contrast of the recovered secret
image as that in conventional scheme 1 [80]. Although the security is weak-
ened in the proposed scheme than that in the conventional scheme [81], the pixel
expansion efficiency and contrast of decrypted images are improved. Other lit-
eratures [75, 76] also show that it is a reasonable choice to improve contrast in
VSS.
Consequently, the proposed scheme is superior in pixel expansion efficiency
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to conventional scheme 2 [81].
5.5 Experimental Results
The proposed scheme is implemented on (2, 3)-threshold VSS method in this ex-
periment. Verification images are those shown in Figs. 5.4 (a), (b), and (c), re-
spectively. The secret and fake secret images are those shown in Figs. 5.4 (d) and
(e), respectively.
Figures 5.7 (a), (b), and (c) show secret image shares S 1, S 2, and S 3, respec-
tively, and Figs. 5.7 (d), (e), and (f) are verification image shares V1, V2, and V3,
respectively. Figs.5.7 (g), (h), and (i) are revealed verification images. Figs.5.7 (j),
(k), and (l) are revealed secret images. As added pixels can’t be accurately esti-
mated, so it is impossible to generate fake secret share.
5.6 Conclusions
This chapter has improved the visual secret sharing schemes with cheat-preven-
tion. The proposed scheme has better performance than conventional scheme
1 [80] in cheat-prevention functionality and less pixel expansion than conven-
tional scheme 2 [81]. The proposed scheme can be applied to (k, n)-threshold
VSS different from a latest scheme [82] which is only suitable for (2, n)-threshold
VSS. The effectiveness of the proposed scheme has been confirmed through ex-
perimental results.
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(a) Verification im-
age V1.
(b) Verification im-
age V2.
(c) Verification im-
age V3.
(d) Secret image.
(e) Share image S 1. (f) Share image S 2.
(g) Share image S 3. (h) Verification image share V1.
(i) Verification image share V2. (j) Verification image share V3.
(k) V1 + S 2. (l) V1 + S 3.
(m) V2 + S 3. (n) V2 + S 1.
(o) V3 + S 1. (p) V3 + S 2.
(q) S 1 + S 2. (r) S 2 + S 3.
(s) S 1 + S 3. (t) S 1 + S 2 + S 3.
Figure 5.3: An example of conventional cheat-prevention VSS scheme 1 [80] on
(2, 3)-threshold VSS [66]. Image shares and verification image shares are five
times larger in width to verification and secret images, i.e., m + 2 = 5.
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(a) Verification im-
age V1.
(b) Verification im-
age V2.
(c) Verification im-
age V3.
(d) Secret image. (e) Fake secret im-
age.
(f) V3 + S 3. (g) V3 + F1. (h) V3 + F2.
(i) S 3 + F1. (j) S 3 + F2.
Figure 5.4: Attack [81] to conventional scheme 1 [80].
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(a) S 1. (b) S 2.
(c) S 3. (d) V1.
(e) V2. (f) V3.
(g) V1 + S 2. (h) V1 + S 3.
(i) V2 + S 1. (j) V2 + S 3.
(k) V3 + S 1. (l) V3 + S 2.
(m) S 1 + S 2. (n) S 2 + S 3.
(o) S 3 + S 1. (p) S 1 + S 2 + S 3.
Figure 5.5: An example of conventional scheme 2 [81] on (2, 3)-threshold VSS
method [66] with Eq. (5.1). Pixels in the secret image are expanded to seven
subpixles under the condition that foiling up two collusive parties, i.e., m + (u +
1) + 1 = 3 + 3 + 1 = 7. The contrast of the recovered secret images are low.
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(a) S 1. (b) S 2. (c) S 3.
(d) V1. (e) V2. (f) V3.
(g) V1 + S 2. (h) V1 + S 3. (i) V3 + S 2.
(j) S 1 + S 2. (k) S 2 + S 3. (l) S 1 + S 2 + S 3.
Figure 5.6: An example of conventional scheme [82] on (2, 3)-threshold
VSS [82].
(a) S 1. (b) S 2. (c) S 3.
(d) V1. (e) V2. (f) V3.
(g) V3 + S 1. (h) V3 + S 2. (i) V3 + S 3.
(j) S 1 + S 2. (k) S 2 + S 3. (l) S 1 + S 2 + S 3.
Figure 5.7: An example of the proposed scheme on (2, 3)-threshold VSS
method [66].
Chapter 6
Conclusions
In this thesis, visually encrypted images for rights protection and authentication
is studied. Visually encrypted images approach image trading system and visual
cryptography. In image trading system, visual encryption protects privacy of cus-
tomer better than the conventional schemes do. In visual cryptography, it provides
a way to authenticate shares presented by other share holders. Through considera-
tion of new expression and perspective of visually encrypted images, new schemes
are proposed in image trading system and visual cryptography.
6.1 Results and Contribution
Chapter 2 In Chapter 2, visually encrypted images are introduced. First, the
generation of amplitude-only image is discussed. There are two types of them
by domains, which are discrete Fourier transformation based amplitude-only im-
age and discrete cosine transformation based amplitude-only image. Secondly,
amplitude-only image with random signs are discussed. Thirdly, secret sharing,
visual cryptography and their relationship are roughly reviewed.
Chapter 3 In Chapter 3, an image trading system using amplitude-only images
for privacy- and copyright-protection is proposed. In the proposed system, copy-
right of image is protected by fingerprinting embedded into the amplitude-only
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image; the privacy of customer is also conserved. Because it is quite difficult to
estimate the content of original image from amplitude-only image. The proposed
scheme can protect privacy better than the conventional schemes. Furthermore,
the proposed scheme has better performance in fingerprinting against normal at-
tacks than conventional schemes.
Chapter 4 Chapter 4 is an extension of image trading system in chapter 3. As
mentioned above, while transmitting or storing images with enormous data, com-
pression (reversible or non-reversible) is often requested. Distortion is large when
compression is introduced into the image trading system in chapter 3. In Chap-
ter 4, an image trading system with efficient compression is proposed. In the
proposed system, while generating amplitude-only image, random sign matrix is
introduced; by dong so, distortion brought by compression is reduced. In the
proposed system, fingerprinting can be extracted with higher accuracy than con-
ventional systems when images are lossy compressed.
Chapter 5 Chapter 5 proposes a cheat-prevention visual secret sharing sheme
with efficient pixel expansion. Generally, while generating secret image shares,
matrixM is used. In conventional scheme, cheat-prevention is achieved by adding
2 columns to the basic matrixM. However, special attack will break this scheme,
in other word, cheat will be successful. In others, special attack will fail to cheat.
However, basic matrixM is much more expanded which leads to lower visibility
of revealed secret image. In the proposed scheme, basic matrixM is analyzed. The
problems which lead the conventional schemes fail is carefully studied. By adding
randomness to generating matrices, the proposed scheme preserve the ability of
cheating immune and enhance the contrast of revealed secret image.
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6.2 Open Problem
The employment of visually encrypted images has revealed a new direction in im-
age trading system for copyright protection and privacy conservation. It has also
provided a new way to authenticate. The methods described in this thesis provide
a starting point to develop new approaches. Several possibilities are: (1) more
robust system for fingerprinting technique (2) less pixel expansion with higher
contrast of revealed secret image.
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